Fabian Wendt is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and core faculty member of the Kellogg Center for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Virginia Tech. He previously held positions at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapman University, Bielefeld University, the University of Hamburg, and Heidelberg University, and he was a visiting scholar at the University of Arizona. He earned his Habilitation in philosophy from the University of Hamburg and his Ph.D. from the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.
- Property rights
- Distributive justice
- Political authority
- Habilitation in Philosophy, University of Hamburg, 2015
- PhD in Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, 2008
- MA (Magister Artium) in Philosophy and Political Science, University of Regensburg, 2005
- Sanders Prize in Political Philosophy for the article “Rescuing Public Justification from Public Reason Liberalism” (2017).
- Third prize at the first essay contest of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy for “Gerechtigkeit ist nicht alles: Über Immigration und sozialen Frieden” (2016).
- Authority. Cambridge: Polity Press (Key Concepts in Political Theory series), 2018. German translation: Politische Autorität: Eine Einführung. Münster: Mentis, 2018.
- Compromise, Peace and Public Justification: Political Morality Beyond Justice. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- (ed.): Compromising on Justice. Special issue of Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (Vol. 16, No. 4), 2013. Reprinted as Compromising on Justice. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Libertäre politische Philosophie. Paderborn: Mentis (Perspectives in Analytic Philosophy series), 2009.
Against Philosophical Anarchism. Law and Philosophy 39: 527-544, 2020.
In Defense of Unfair Compromises. Philosophical Studies 176 (11): 2855-2875, 2019.
Rescuing Public Justification from Public Reason Liberalism. In D. Sobel, S. Wall and P. Vallentyne (eds.): Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Vol. 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press (pp. 39-64), 2019.
Three Types of Sufficientarian Libertarianism. Res Publica 25 (3): 301-318, 2019.
Why Theorize Modus Vivendi? In J. Horton, U. Willems and M. Westphal (eds.): The Political Theory of Modus Vivendi. Heidelberg: Springer (pp. 31-47), 2018.
Compromise and the Value of Widely Accepted Laws. In C. Rostbøll and T. Scavenius (eds.): Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory. London: Routledge (pp. 50-62), 2017.
The Sufficiency Proviso. In J. Brennan, B. van der Vossen and D. Schmidtz (eds.): Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism. London: Routledge (pp. 169-183), 2017.
On Realist Legitimacy. Social Philosophy and Policy 32 (2): 227-245, 2016.
Political Authority and the Minimal State. Social Theory and Practice 42 (1): 97-122, 2016.
The Moral Standing of Modus Vivendi Arrangements. Public Affairs Quarterly 30 (4): 351-370, 2016.
Justice and Political Authority in Left-Libertarianism. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 14 (3): 316-339, 2015.
Peace beyond Compromise. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (4): 573-593, 2013.
Slaves, Prisoners, and Republican Freedom. Res Publica 17 (2): 175-192, 2011.
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